Tied affectedness? Grassroots resistance and the World Bank by Jokubauskaite, Giedre
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jokubauskaite, G. (2019) Tied affectedness? Grassroots resistance and the 
World Bank. Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal, 3(5-6), pp. 703-724.   
(doi:10.1080/23802014.2018.1595125) 
 
 
There may be differences between this version and the published version. 
You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from 
it.  
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/181675/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Deposited on: 12 March 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of       
           Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
 
1 
 
Tied Affectedness? Grassroots resistance and the World Bank 
 
Dr Giedre Jokubauskaite 
 
The first part of research for this paper was conducted as: 
Post-Doctoral Research Associate, Durham Law School 
University of Durham, UK 
 
The second part of research for this paper was conducted as: 
Lecturer in International Law 
School of Law, University of Glasgow 
 
Abstract: This paper argues that there can be no category of ‘affected people’ without a decision-making 
process that triggers affectedness in the first place. In that sense, affectedness is a category that is by 
default, although not irreversibly, ‘tied’ to a certain institutional context. In this paper, I examine such 
‘tied’ quality of affectedness by focusing on the benefits and dangers of the affectedness paradigm to 
grassroots organisations in the context of World Bank projects. Whilst in principle the category of 
‘affected people’ seems to empower the grassroots, this article argues that the danger of institutional co-
optation in this context is also high. The World Bank and its borrowers have full discretion to include, but 
also to exclude, people from this category. Therefore, the voices of grassroots organisations relying on 
this paradigm can be instrumentalised and distorted. This article suggests that mediation can help to 
‘untie’ affectedness from the top-down institutional discourse, in order to create space for a more 
balanced dialogue between resistance groups and decision-makers.  
Keywords: participation and power, resistance and activism, co-optation, affected people, mediation, 
international development.  
 
Introduction 
Development projects affect certain people more so than others. In practice of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) this understanding is captured by a notion of ‘affected people’. Affectedness represents 
an idea that those who are seriously affected by a given decision should not be coerced into obedience, 
but rather should be given a chance to take part in the relevant decision-making. In a similar vein, affected 
people should be given an opportunity to raise issues and/or make complaints, if such decision harms 
them in a disproportionate manner. In this special issue such an idea is conceptualised as ‘the affectedness 
paradigm’, which is arguably on the rise not only in development circles, but also in other areas of global 
governance1. 
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In some ways affectedness can be understood as an ‘invited participation’, defined by Cornwall as a 
participation that was ‘orchestrated by an external agency of some kind’2. However, whilst participation is 
usually ‘invited’ by definition (in the sense explained by Cornwall) affectedness can be created by the 
very fact of decision-making, without any such process of inclusion taking place. It would therefore be 
inaccurate to treat affectedness as a restatement of the participation debate, and to claim that academic 
literature on participation can help us to understand the significance and/or the challenges of the 
affectedness paradigm. Together with other papers in this volume, my analysis therefore advances a new 
set of questions that emerge from this emerging paradigm in global governance, focusing in particular on 
how affectedness operates in the context of international development interventions. 
The notion of affectedness became commonplace in official development discourse through the work of 
independent accountability mechanisms, such as the World Bank Inspection Panel (the Panel)3.  These 
accountability mechanisms enable complaints from the people harmed by development interventions, 
when harm is induced by the funder’s non-compliance with its policies4.  Nonetheless, in practice people 
actually become ‘affected’ by development project as a result of operational decision-making by the 
borrower and its funders. This explains why my paper aims to go beyond the focus on accountability 
mechanisms and their jurisprudence, which has already been discussed in great detail in the literature on 
the functioning of the Inspection Panel5. Accordingly, this paper looks at the shift towards ‘affectedness’ 
through a conceptual lens, rather than focusing on the technical details of how the World Bank and/or 
Inspection Panel operates. My objective is to ask some broader questions about affectedness as a 
governance category, and to understand how, if at all, it changed the nature of decision-making process in 
international development6.  
The idea of affected people as a governance category that developed in the context of IFIs should be 
distinguished from the grassroots resistance, which is mounted by the real-life social movements that 
challenge development projects.  These movements, many of which consist of indigenous peoples, are 
fairly well documented and studied7. They are usually informal, community-based, self-organised groups 
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of people that are exposed to the consequences of development, and thus contest development 
interventions at a foundational level. The aim of such contestation is usually to protect the precarious 
social balance represented by the status quo.8 There can be several groups resisting the same project (e.g. 
numerous indigenous communities9); and also a single project might be beneficial to some, whilst 
potentially resisted by others.10 The focus of this paper is on the latter category of negatively affected 
grassroots that challenge the dominant development model and/or the settled development path 
envisioned by the government. 
In practice the category of ‘affected people’ operates in the same issue area that is challenged by the 
grassroots movements. Arguably not by accident, IFIs readily accept as ‘affected people’ the persons who 
risk losing access to natural resources; who might be removed from their land; and whose lifestyle as 
indigenous peoples is threatened by a given project11; all of which are the groups that are most likely to 
challenge development projects12. Therefore, it seems fair to assume that the category of affected people 
was created as a response to the movements of resistance at both, local and international level13. However, 
to what extent can the grassroots ‘trust’ this category as an avenue for defending their cause? What are the 
advantages but also the dangers of their engagement with such emerging affectedness paradigm in 
international development? 
My paper addresses these questions by focusing on one key facet of affectedness, notably the fact that in 
order for someone to be affected, there has to be a decision, and thus an authoritative institution that 
makes such a decision in the first place. This is not to say that affectedness is only generated by 
international institutions and their decision-making. A group of people can call themselves ‘affected’ in 
order to mobilise a wider community and to demand for certain entitlements, in which case affectedness 
becomes a category that enables political contestation and satisfies a quest for inclusion14. Nonetheless, 
these political demands are inevitably conditioned by the decisions already taken, because affectedness, 
by definition, is based on a political ‘irritant’, i.e. on an exercise of authority by a competent institution. 
Put otherwise, there can be no affectedness without an authoritative act of affecting. In that sense, 
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affectedness comes with a certain pre-loaded, top-down governance bias. This is what I call the ‘tied’ 
quality of affectedness. The relationship between the top-down decision-making, and the bottom-up social 
practice, is therefore bound to cause tensions and disagreements as well as theoretical problems for 
governance frameworks based on the affectedness paradigm.  
Generally, in this paper I argue that without specific measures to address such an implied top-down bias, 
affectedness can have little emancipatory potential. The risk of co-optation, where local voices are 
instrumentalised rather than taken seriously, is high. Moreover, bottom-up movements often do not 
perceive development projects as economic opportunities or ‘freedoms’15, but rather as top-down 
impositions that create social disruption and redefine the conditions of co-existence in a given society. In 
this paper I argue that one of the key questions about affectedness is who should identify the affected 
people and make sure that they are properly included into such bargaining process. I suggest that due to 
their decision-making bias, neither the Bank, nor its satellite bodies such as the Panel are fit to take on 
such a role; however, similar role could be fulfilled by the independent third-party mediators. 
The argument in this paper advances in three steps. Firstly, I show the diversity of resistance movements 
as captured by the academic literature and explain the rise of affectedness paradigm in the World Bank 
governance framework. Secondly, I identify the core advantages, as well as the issues that become 
apparent when we look at the use of affectedness paradigm by the grassroots. Finally, I make a case for a 
potential role of the third-party mediators to ascertain affected people, as one strategy that might help to 
‘untie’ affectedness from its institutional bias. I end with a few concluding remarks about the unsettled 
nature of affectedness paradigm.  
A diversity of grassroots resistance  
As any non-institutionalised phenomenon, grassroots resistance can be difficult to pin down. Even though 
it has been identified and studied carefully, scholarly accounts contain significant differences, some of 
which I underline in this section.  
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The key element that connects all resistance movements and is captured in most academic accounts is 
their stance against certain dogmas of capitalism. To be more precise, the common factor tends to be their 
stance against the homogenising tendencies of modern, capitalist social structure16. For instance, such a 
view is articulated by a group of indigenous scholars17 who claim that  
‘the grammar of modernity involves … the normalisation of three particular desires:... 1) Modern teleologies 
(based on a seamless notion of progress as social engineering achieved through science and technology); 
2) innocent heroic protagonism (anthropocentric agency grounded on Cartesian subjectivities, i.e. being solely 
defined  by “thinking”); and 3) totalising forms of knowledge production (i.e. knowing/naming the world to 
control it...).18 
This idea of alternatives to capitalist mindset and counter-hegemony can be found in most accounts about 
resistance. Development projects on the other hand tend to be the focal point around which and/or against 
which resistance movements can be mobilised. That is because by and large development policies tend to 
have some neoliberal tint – even in those instances where the projects are aimed at improving the lives of 
local and indigenous communities19. Generally, the focus of the IFIs, including that of the World Bank, is 
on the economic development20, recast more recently in a broad aim of poverty reduction. Development 
funding therefore exhibits exactly the sort of ‘grammar of modernity’ grounded in efficiency and income-
generation that Ahenakew et al. are referring to, and that many of the groups opposing development 
projects tend to find so alien, imposing and therefore unacceptable.  
Beyond this shared entry point and convergence at the ideological level, modes of resistance differ. 
Probably the most established understanding of resistance is grounded in cultural identity, or other types 
of identity politics21. In many scholarly accounts about resistance, culture is the element that triggers self-
identification, and also, potentially, claims to self-determination of the entire community. Indigenous 
peoples tend to be the core group here; although the scope of cultural identity can be broader than that. 
Agency can also come into being through ethnicity, religion, caste. Social movements based on cultural 
identity are usually placed in contrast with resistance movements that emphasise class, and the 
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exploitative relations between capital and labour (e.g., trade unions)22. Nonetheless, arguably such class-
focused way of perceiving resistance is still based on a particular type of identity claim, notably the one 
that emphasises worker mentality, as opposed to that of a bourgeoisie.  
A significant departure from this identity-based understanding of resistance is offered by Partha 
Chatterjee through his concept of ‘political society’23. Chatterjee posits the notion of political society as a 
messy, spontaneous, unchartered, and at times violent ‘alter-ego’ of civil society24. Political society comes 
into being in situations where groups of people lead their lives in a close proximity to each other, often 
faced with similar threats and/or dangers. Often these groups exist on the edges of legality (Chatterjee 
calls this ‘paralegal arrangements’)25; meaning that their day-to-day behaviour might be against formal 
laws; but the groups survive because they serve some function in a wider society. Chatterjee uses an 
example of a slum dwelling next to a railway line, where the occupiers have no formal rights to use the 
land, but they nonetheless develop certain relations (of both, dependence but also resistance) with the 
governmental authorities.  
Chatterjee explains this situation by making a distinction between ‘citizens’ and ‘population groups’, the 
governance of which is ‘less a matter of politics and more of administrative policy, a business for experts 
rather than for political representatives’26. Political society is formed on the basis of population groups, 
which are bound as units of governance in the eyes of the authorities. If groups of political society behave 
strategically, they might be able to negotiate certain governance entitlements27 from the government, for 
instance, an access to electricity on the land that they use without formal right to do so. However, they 
cannot claim rights (for instance, a right to adequate housing)28 because their status as a population group 
is qualitatively different from that of a group of law-abiding citizens. 
In Chatterjee’s account, political society functions in times and spaces that are different from the 
‘homogenous time and space’ of a capitalist society29. Nonetheless, the members of such groups do not 
necessarily have a sharp stance against dominant capitalist structure. In fact, their survival depends on the 
ability to co-exist with it. Political society is constantly struggling to negotiate the more favourable terms 
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and conditions of such co-existence30. However, when they succeed, ‘the success [of these populations 
groups] is necessarily temporary and contextual’31, because the entitlements that they acquire have to be 
constantly reasserted and re-negotiated in the face of changes in governing elites and their developmental 
priorities.  
In Chatterjee’s account, political society is not necessarily ‘glued together’ by culture and/or identity32. 
Instead, its existence is triggered through a need for political mobilisation (for instance, because the land 
where a group lives is at risk of being repossessed for a development project). Over time such an 
‘empirically assembled population group’33 is ‘invested with a moral content of a community’34. This 
way, the members of a group acquire the sense of being a part of a collective, and a resulting self-
identification with that particular group.  
The notion of resistance resulting from political society is therefore wider and more malleable than the 
one that is offered by the scholars focusing on identity. The counter-hegemonic claims emanating from 
such groups are also likely to be less radical and thus more amenable to co-optation. That is because 
development does not explicitly threaten the collective identity of such a group, as in case of indigenous 
peoples or certain religious minorities. Nonetheless, development project causes disruption, because it re-
opens a question of hard-negotiated paralegal arrangements that political society had reached with the 
government over time. Hence, whilst the group members of political society have good reasons to resist 
development, they are likely to be more open to more diverse development solutions than the people 
whose resistance is organised along the lines of ethnic and/or cultural identity. 
The aim of the preceding introduction to basic concepts is to demonstrate that the idea of resistance 
covers a diverse range of social movements that differ in terms of origins, motivations and claims that are 
being advanced. All such movements and groups are exercising some form of self-governance that is 
usually informal and cannot be adequately identified or understood through ideas of citizenship, civil 
society, or public administration. Accordingly, the governance category of ‘affected people’ can only be 
examined in the light of this diversity of claims and situations.  
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‘Affected people’ and the World Bank 
In development context the term ‘affected people’ means at least two things: the fact of being (potentially) 
affected by a given development intervention; and a specific governance category used by the IFIs. In 
case of the World Bank, the idea of affectedness first came from the civil society organisations (CSOs) 
active in late 1980s. At the time, CSOs mobilised against some controversial projects funded by the Bank, 
such as Polonoroeste in Brazil35and Narmada in India36 in order to show the negative consequences of the 
Bank’s funding on the local populations. The idea of affected people originally employed by the CSOs 
merely attempted to register the very fact that such negative effects existed37. Over time, the Bank has 
recognised affectedness as a relevant factor in its decision-making, and endowed it with some normative 
content. Eventually, the fact of being affected led to certain entitlements in terms of project consultations, 
disclosure and grievance, as well as ability to file complaints in front of the Inspection Panel. However, 
the two categories are not identical. That is because the Bank prioritises certain facts of affectedness over 
others, and in doing so, it grants governance entitlements to some affected people, but not to others. For 
instance, only the people who suffered ‘adverse material harm’ as a cause of the Bank’s non-compliance 
with its policies can make complaints to the Panel.38As a result, a number of cultural, social and inter-
generational effects are currently excluded from the Panel’s understanding of affectedness39.  
Since the late 1980s the Bank has taken several significant steps in creating governance entitlements to 
people affected by its projects. Over the years, the so-called ‘safeguard policies’, especially those on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)40, Indigenous Peoples41, Involuntary Resettlement42 and project 
supervision more generally43 introduced a range of entitlements that varied depending on the issue area. 
For example, the EIA policy would set out some general requirements for consultation, whilst the 
safeguards on Indigenous Peoples would require for the Bank to ensure a more explicit ‘broad community 
support’. The Inspection Panel, established in 1993, issued a number of reports that fostered institutional 
learning in this area44. In 2015 the Bank has launched the Grievance Redress Service (GRS), an internal 
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‘problem solving’ mechanism for addressing grievances suffered by affected people45. It enabled affected 
people to seek faster remedies, without triggering the fully-fledged investigation by the Panel. The aim 
was to create further opportunities for review, which would be more accessible to affected people than the 
procedure in front of the Panel46.  
The emphasis on ‘affected people’ is also one of the landmark changes coming out of the Bank’s most 
recent reform that started in 2012 and led up to the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF)47. The 
ESF makes a distinction between three main governance categories: a) stakeholders; b) affected parties 
(or people); c) vulnerable and disadvantaged persons. The first category involves various ‘interested 
parties’, including NGOs and lobby groups that might have a stake in the project outcome48. The second 
category is a loose group of people who will (potentially) experience consequences of a project (both 
negative and positive)49.  The third category is a sub-category within the ‘affected people’ category, 
focusing in particular on those persons who are likely to remain outside the consultation process, unless 
they are specifically included in it (disabled persons being a clear example of a group falling within such 
a category)50.  
If compared to the previous policies, the ESF expands governance entitlements to all three categories 
identified above. For instance, (potentially) affected people now have to be included in the project 
decision-making process as early as possible, instead of in the advanced stages of project appraisal51. 
Also, any significant change of circumstances and/or project plans is supposed to trigger the repeated 
consultation and/or access to project grievances52. No comparable requirements exist in the current 
safeguard policies. Altogether, these developments constitute an elaborate and comprehensive policy 
framework within the Bank, which is open directly to affected people, and which creates concrete 
entitlements for them to take part in the governance of development projects.   
However, if examined more closely, this governance framework based on affectedness relies heavily on 
the will of decision-makers, i.e., above all, the Bank and its borrowers. Firstly, that is because there is a 
lot of uncertainty about how to ascertain the categories of affectedness in practice. For instance, many 
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governments and CSOs in the recent consultation over the Draft Guidance Notes53 voiced concerns about 
identification of groups that fall under the various categories noted above. The ESF gives us guidelines 
about some instances of affectedness (mainly related to land54 and/or indigenous peoples55), but 
consultations show that many other provisions remain vague and in need of further clarification.  
When asked about this56, the drafters of the ESF and the Guidance Notes repeatedly pointed out that 
development projects are too diverse, and that the identification exercise of affected people is inevitably 
contingent on the circumstances of a particular project57. Nonetheless, it can be argued that such 
contingency-induced open-endedness of the concept is also one of the reasons why affectedness is so 
closely ‘tied’ to the will and agenda of decision-makers. That is because the more open-ended is the 
category of ‘affected people’, the more discretion both the Bank and the borrower have to reinterpret 
and/or deny the entitlements (such as participation in decision-making process or access to project-related 
information), depending on their political priorities. Indeed, as argued by Chatterjee, entitlements do not 
function in the same way as rights, nor do they accord the same level of legal certainty and/or protection 
as rights do. 
In practice development planning is also a lengthy administrative process, which treats affected people as 
‘population groups’ rather than rights’ bearers58.  Usually, the borrower hires external consultants to 
conduct the study of environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA), which includes consultations 
with potentially affected people, which then leads to the preparation of project implementation plans59. In 
the meantime, the Bank has to make sure that all the requirements set out in its policies are adhered to by 
the borrower and its consultants; and that all the environmental and social concerns, especially those 
voiced by affected people, are well represented in various implementation plans and in practice.  
The nature of this process becomes apparent by looking at concrete examples. For instance, in the project 
aimed to increase water supply to Nairobi (Kenya), people making a complaint to the Panel (the 
requesters) and living in the water catchment area ‘were not aware of the Project, even after construction 
has started’60. In response to this, the Panel commended a number of consultation meetings that were put 
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in place by the project planners and a number of people that attended them61, without, however, 
questioning the substance and/or representativeness of these meetings, nor their outcomes.  Similarly, the 
lack of written responses by the project implementing agency was not seen as problematic by the Panel62. 
This example and others below show that in practice affected people are often treated as statistical units 
whose engagement is valid to an extent that it fulfils the administrative requirements of the project. This 
makes the entitlements of affected people extremely similar to that of population groups, i.e. their chances 
of being heard and their ‘bargaining position’ is above all contingent on a good relationship with project 
administrators.  
It is also notable from this example that the principal body ensuring interpretation and application of the 
safeguard policies is the Inspection Panel. The Panel has made some important claims about the standards 
of good environmental and social practice in development, including the treatment of affected people63. 
The Panel has also been called a ‘citizen-driven mechanism’64, based on the fact that its investigations are 
always triggered by the local people who consider themselves to be affected; thus reinforcing the 
entitlements accorded to them by the Bank65. Indeed, without the existence of the Panel, entitlements to 
affected people would be but hollow commitments without tangible mechanisms of ensuring their 
application in practice. 
At the same time, the Panel remains constrained by the fact that it is funded by the Bank66, and that it is 
only directly accountable to the World Bank’s Board of Directors67. Because of that, its investigations are 
always attuned to the discursive climate and practices of the Bank. For example, in the recent case in 
Mongolia the complaint concerned the expansion of an existing coal mine, which had already caused 
various health, environmental and social problems68. Amongst other things, the requesters complained 
about the Bank disregarding viable alternatives to the project. In response to this, the Panel accepted that 
the ‘analysis of alternatives is outside the scope of the [cumulative impact assessment]’ funded by the 
project.69 Therefore, the Panel engaged with the negative effects of the project assuming that the 
expansion of the mine cannot be questioned, and that the Bank’s role is merely to ‘ensure good 
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consultation practice within the framework of the Bank’s policies’70, rather than to prevent concrete and 
immanent harm to the affected people.  
In this and other similar examples, the affected people could exercise their entitlement to file a complaint, 
but they could not demand for the least harmful alternatives to be prioritized over development ‘solutions’ 
chosen by the government. Importantly, this observation is not meant to criticize the Panel for its 
approach or faulty reasoning. It is meant to emphasise that the institutional design of the Panel’s review 
process relies heavily on the decisions already made, and as such, it ‘ties’ affectedness to the existing 
development goals and priorities. Therefore, whilst many affected communities were able to benefit from 
the Panel’s procedure, the solutions to their problems were always constructed on the Bank’s own terms.  
In that sense, the ‘success’ of communities engaging with the Panel tends to be ‘temporary and 
contextual’, as is aptly put by Chatterjee71. It is ‘temporary’ because every remedy put forward by the 
Panel is limited to the stage of decision-making during which the complaint was launched. There are no 
guarantees of future entitlements, and the complaint can be readily deferred under the excuse that the 
Bank and the borrower will do better in the future. Hence, in Mongolian saga of complaints, the Panel 
refused to continue several investigations based on the fact that the ‘quality of the studies can only be 
assessed after the final draft is available’72 (but not as a part of the complaint). Similarly, in Kenyan case, 
the related ‘projects, which the Bank has to date not committed to support, would require their own 
assessments’73. Indeed, promises are often made by the Panel and the Bank’s planners to ensure better 
treatment of affected people in the future. However, these promises are entirely discretionary. Neither the 
management of the Bank nor the Panel can provide guarantees to affected people about decisions that 
will be made after the Panel issues its report; or decision beyond the official completion date of the 
project in those cases where the promises are being monitored by the Panel. Overall, this exposes the 
strictness of an ‘institutional frame’ in which the Panel operates, and how much the time span of 
affectedness is confined to the decisions made by the Bank and its borrowers. 
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Despite all these shortcomings, the expanded scope of participatory entitlements introduced by the ESF is 
likely to further enhance the role of the Panel74, and to instigate more attempts from the grassroots to 
channel their claims by using the affectedness framework. It is therefore crucial to try and understand 
what are the gains and the risks of positioning resistance under the World Bank’s category of ‘affected 
people’.  
Affectedness as a space for resistance? 
 Advantages 
On a positive side, the affectedness paradigm creates some promising opportunities for bottom-up 
governance. It offers a clearly recognised route of communication with decision-makers. If we accept the 
concept of political society by Chatterjee, such an institutionalised route might come across as a welcome 
reinforcement in the struggle of the grassroots movements. For example, requesters concerned with the 
road infrastructure project in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) complained about gender-based 
violence, poor treatment of workers and complicity of military personnel in violence against the local 
groups. As a result of this complaint, the Bank committed to changing its supervision practice in a way 
that would prevent further misconduct by the employees of private contractors and the military75.  Hence, 
in specific cases like this one, affectedness might help local communities to be heard by the state 
authorities and/or other powerful actors, such as the private developers.  
Affectedness also generally provides opportunities for the people to become beneficiaries of a given 
project, because it might lead to new beneficial components being added to the initial project design. In 
Kenyan case, the Panel uncovered that implementation plan of the new forestry law supported by the 
World Bank did not take into sufficient consideration the land rights of indigenous peoples. Here, the 
involvement of the Panel nudged the Bank to enter into further dialogue with the government of Kenya 
about the new strategies of recognising indigenous land claims within the designated forests. Hence, if 
taken seriously, affectedness paradigm can create a possibility for grassroots to influence  development of 
a specific sector, area or industry in a given society. 
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Even in more openly adversarial situations, where the prospects of a mutual agreement between decision-
makers and affected people are slim, affectedness can aid the mobilisation of resistance. Arguably, it can 
prevent communities from forcefully trying to protect their habitat, be it through a one-off act of 
resistance such as setting fire to the coal mine in Ecuador76, or through more widely spread resistance 
efforts such as the attempts by local communities to sabotage oil pipelines in the Niger delta77. In contrast 
to such radical measures, affectedness indicates if not an assurance, then at least a possibility of 
constructive dialogue and outcome. Above all, a structured, institutionalised route for inclusion created by 
affectedness arguably nourishes the faith of local groups that there exists a possibility of a fair and 
peaceful resolution. This, in turn, diminishes the chances of open violence and further marginalisation of 
certain voices. 
Co-optation 
Nonetheless, there are also issues and dangers for the grassroots organisations to cast themselves as 
‘affected people’. Some of the issues stem from the fact that affectedness as a governance category is also 
a strategy of institutionalisation for the IFIs.  As discussed previously, resistance tends be informal and 
rely heavily on the personal trust, shared values, collective identity and also shared material space (such 
as land, housing, equipment). Affectedness, on the other hand, helps to ‘translate’ this informal logic in a 
way that fits the controlled, hierarchical and abstract logic of financial institutions and their functioning.  
A helpful distinction in that regard is made by Deleuze and Guattari78 who differentiate between rhizomic 
and arborescent assamblages79. The former are fluid social gatherings, without a determined structure, 
decentred and adaptable. Potatoes have rhizomic structure in the natural environment. Arborescent 
assamblages on the other hand are rigid, hierarchical, solidly built social organisations that rely on a clear 
internal structure: like trees.  They are less adaptable but more predictable and are organised around a 
central ‘trunk’, i.e. a clearly identifiable organisational and ideological core. This distinction captures 
some of the core differences between the two types of social dynamics (the one of resistance, and that of 
the IFIs). Horowitz uses this distinction in her work that examines the relationship between the grassroots 
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and UNESCO80. In particular, she helps us to understand why co-optation is highly likely to occur in the 
situations where ‘rhizomic resistance meets arborescent assemblage’81; that is, where local grassroots 
organisations choose to cooperate with international institutions such as UNESCO or, indeed, the World 
Bank.  
According to Horowitz, even powerful arborescent institutions such as IFIs might seek to co-opt 
resistance claims, in order to benefit from the social legitimacy and authority that grassroots carry with 
them as rhizomic assemblages of society. For instance, in a project involving indigenous people in 
Cambodia82, the World Bank had to show a ‘broad community support’ of the local communities that 
would benefit from the project in order to legitimise its intervention. However, communities that took part 
in the consultations, as well as listing their development priorities, expressed a range of concerns about 
the project. Their core concern was to prevent the sudden influx of non-indigenous settlers in their lands. 
Nonetheless, such participation of indigenous groups was used by the Bank to justify and legitimise the 
controversial outcomes of the project, which facilitated the in-migration to indigenous lands and 
subsequently ‘outnumbered and outvoted’ indigenous peoples in the local political arena83.This example 
is in line with the Horowitz’s finding that ‘often the established [arborescent] institution will attempt to 
neutralise opposition by providing carefully controlled opportunities for challengers to express concerns 
within the institution’s own structure’84. 
Horowitz shows us that co-optation can also become an issue in situations where, at least on the surface, 
international institution and the grassroots share the same objectives. For instance, in her case study both, 
UNESCO and the grassroots, were concerned with a conservation of a particular coral reef in New 
Caledonia. Nonetheless, the social movement protests against coastal water pollution was co-opted by 
UNESCO, because UNESCO promised to protect the coral reef by designating it as a World Heritage site, 
without however having any real political or institutional power to stop the pollution. This detracted 
valuable resources from the local movements, mainly by convincing their leaders to change tactics from 
public protests to more formal means of ‘co-managing’ the site85. 
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There are, however, some crucial differences between UNESCO and the IFIs, which create greater 
threats, but also more opportunities for the grassroots. On the one hand, the IFIs can furnish more 
protection to the local groups and help to advance their objectives, because they have more financial 
resources and power to do so than, for instance, UNESCO. On the other hand, IFIs’ arborescent structures 
are also more able to co-opt resistance efforts than UNESCO, because their objectives are less likely to 
align with those of affected people. This is visible from the aforementioned mining infrastructure support 
project in Mongolia86, where one of the areas potentially affected by the project was Lake Baikal, which 
also had the status of the World Heritage site. The preservation of the lake ecosystem was amongst the 
core preoccupations raised by the affected people in this case. Here, the World Bank had the power to 
exert influence on decision-making by the borrower, thus ensuring that the government takes notice of the 
site’s World Heritage status in all the feasibility studies concerning the expansion of mining sector in the 
surrounding area. However, since the ultimate aim of the World Bank was to support development rather 
than to ensure conservation, the Bank was unwilling to go as far as to advise the government to exclude 
Lake Baikal from the project affected area altogether. As such, development priorities of the Bank 
trumped the conservation objectives of the affected groups. Furthermore, the involvement of the Bank in 
this project provided the government of Mongolia with an implicit international stamp of approval to 
create some environmental risks to the ecosystems surrounding Lake Baikal.  
Altogether, these examples show that grassroots movements face a difficult dilemma when they consider 
whether to cast themselves as ‘affected people’ or not. If they choose to cooperate with the World Bank 
and embrace its affectedness paradigm, it significantly increases their chances of being heard by other 
powerful parties, such as the state and/or private investors. However, such choice might come at a high 
price. Once they opt for institutionalised cooperation rather than the self-standing resistance, grassroots 
risk being ‘subsumed’ as a ‘tiny element at the very bottom of the giant hierarchical assemblage, with no 
power to address [exploitative practices]’87, as indeed happened in the consultations over the World 
Bank’s projects discussed above.   
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Political closure and limited agency 
A closely related cluster of issues with the affectedness paradigm concerns the type of agency that is 
created by this category. Here, a convincing criticism at a theoretical level is advanced by Matt Whitt, 
whose argument is addressed not specifically against the use of affectedness by the IFIs but rather the 
very idea of the ‘all-affected principle’ in the theoretical debate about democracy88. Whitt has a problem 
with this principle as an organising device of democratic governance at a global level, because it 
forecloses any discussion and/or contestation about who should be included and/or excluded from the 
demos in the first place. Under this principle people cannot actually choose whether or not they want to 
be a part of a group; also whether a given decision that makes them ‘affected’ was necessary to begin 
with. Instead, they are grouped together into a collective entity through external circumstances, following 
the interests and considerations of the more powerful decision-makers. For Whitt, ‘affecting and being 
affected are both political actions’89 – not some external, self-standing ‘feature of the world’90. All-
affected principle, crucially, portrays them as somehow pre-political; i.e. as a given (an objective fact) 
rather than posited (a contingency created through subjective reasoning). According to Whitt, all-affected 
principle naturalises the decision itself, and at the same time renders invisible the exercise of authority 
involved in a decision to engage in decision-making. In Whitt’s own words, all-affected principle 
‘bestows the prerogative to identify “constituent power” [of affected people] on the most powerful 
economic actors that are most likely to affect others’91.  
Reasons for such theoretical criticism is visible in the World Bank’s use of affectedness paradigm.  
Generally, all the key decisions about development interventions are made by the borrowers, in close 
negotiation with the Bank, private investors, and other development partners92. All the relevant impact 
assessments, plans and related consultations follow from such key decisions93. Here, as explained by 
Whitt, the act of (potential) ‘affecting’ goes first, whilst affectedness follows suite. The key decisions 
about scope, reach, location and type of intervention are simply not in the picture within the discussion 
about the entitlements of affected people, but in the a-priori, supposedly pre-political stage of ‘affecting’.  
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Such governance framework has no identifiable ‘constituent moments’ that can be challenged or 
scrutinised94. At no point in the process of project negotiations the groups of affected people are given the 
possibility to question the general contours of development intervention and whether or not they wish to 
belong to this group. The entire process flows from a certain inertia of decision-making ‘cycle’: from an 
identification of development ‘problem’, to a proposed approach how to resolve it, to an implementation 
of development ‘solutions’. Even though according to the provisions of the ESF, affected people ought to 
be included in this cycle as early as possible, usually the very creation of the decision-making ‘cycle’ and 
particularly the construction of ‘problems’ to be resolved happen before any process of inclusion can be 
initiated. Hence, the boundaries of affectedness in each project are drawn by a straightforward, top-down 
exercise of authority. Understood in this way, affectedness becomes a strategy of closure that justifies 
exclusion and the exercise of political authority, rather than a category that helps to challenge it. 
Whitt’s theoretical challenge seems valid and important, but more so as a warning, rather than a final 
verdict about the emancipatory potential of affectedness paradigm. In practice, it matters a great deal 
whether the (potentially) affected group has an agency to begin with, prior to any development-related 
decisions had been made. In groups with a strong shared identity, affectedness paradigm merely helps to 
channel the claims of an already existing collective entity. It does not create the agency nor its social or 
political foundations. If, however, the only factor that connects the members of a group is the common 
threat and/or opportunity created by development project, then they might acquire an agency – albeit a 
very limited one – specifically through engaging with affectedness paradigm and related dealings with 
decision-makers.  
The stronger the pre-existing bond within group, the less such groups depend on the willingness of 
decision-makers to include them into the category of ‘affected people’. To the contrary, a  group with a 
strong pre-existing agency would be able to challenge the decision of ’affecting’. They can do so, for 
instance, by bringing the claim in front of the Panel, or by asking the relevant domestic institutions to 
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revoke a license that enabled development activities in the first place95. In other words, the pre-existing 
capacity and willingness to self-govern is not automatically removed by the affectedness paradigm. 
This brings me back to the distinction between affectedness as a governance category, and as a real-life 
fact, which results from decisions about development interventions96. There is also a third way of looking 
at affectedness, convincingly advanced by Josh Brem-Wilson in his contribution to this volume97.  
According to him, affectedness is about contesting and thus expanding political space, rather than simply 
accepting a one-way exercise of authority by global governance institutions. Thus, by accepting the role 
of ‘affected people’ social movements enter into the normative space in which they can demand (rather 
than waiting ‘to be invited’) for their agency to be recognised and respected in the relevant decision-
making process. Brem-Wilson’s account portrays affectedness in a more positive light; the one that sees 
affectedness as a way of contesting and thus opening up the political discourse, rather than closing it, as 
was argued by Whitt. Arguably, because the affectedness paradigm in global governance is quite recent, 
its exact implications and content remain unsettled. Its emancipatory potential will be defined through its 
use, interpretation and application in practice.  
The ‘grammar of modernity’ 
The final challenge associated with affectedness has to do with its role in creating a conceptual space for 
institutional discourses to meet alternative viewpoints and discourses. As was argued in the beginning, 
grassroots resistance usually challenges the logic of modern capitalist societies and their ‘totalizing, 
teleological, universalizing, logocentric, anthropocentric … forms of knowledge production’98. IFIs on 
the other hand, tend to organise their policies based on the overarching faith in a linear progress, and are 
often pioneering exactly the kind of modern outlook that is criticised by the grassroots. More than that, 
they usually seek to convert those practices and spaces that do not fit the modern blueprint, for instance, 
by converting the neighbourhood of illegal settlers into a new housing development99. Affectedness as a 
category, even if constructed by the IFIs, is meant to facilitate the sensibility of decision-makers to the 
more critical attitudes. But is it at all possible for these different attitudes to converse? Or is it too naïve to 
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expect for development professionals to pay genuine attention to bottom-up contestation, and to rethink 
their plans accordingly?  
In my view, it is impossible to give a conclusive answer to this question. On the one hand, the World 
Bank has shown in the past some capacity to learn from external feedback and adjust its harmful 
practices. For instance, it created the World Bank Inspection Panel, and it phased out the most radical 
forms of much criticised structural adjustment programmes100. The ESF reform too, indicates some 
change in the policy climate of the Bank towards more inclusion of external voices101. For instance, the 
ESF officially adopted the requirement of a Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) by indigenous 
peoples102. It also officially accepts that consultations over project negotiations ought to be 
‘meaningful’103 and that they must be conducted in the ‘culturally appropriate manner’104.  
However, on a more pessimistic side, many of these changes are highly limited. For instance, it has 
already been clarified by the Bank that a requirement to seek FPIC does not actually give indigenous 
peoples a veto right to block the project from taking place105. As mentioned previously, in its projects the 
World Bank tends to set the parameters of a debate. In that sense, it does seem naïve to claim that 
affectedness paradigm brought a conclusive shift towards more neutral climate of communication 
between the development ‘mainstream’ and the alternative outlook that is pioneered by the grassroots 
resistance. 
Probably the most convincing explanation about why the World Bank remains so firmly attuned with 
certain dogmas of economic development comes from Sarfaty, who did some illuminating ethnographic 
research about the functioning of the institution106. According to her, the institutional culture at the Bank 
is strongly dominated by people trained in economics, which also means that economic ‘interpretative 
frame’ prevails in its policy-making107. The key issue with such economic discourse is that it tends to re-
imagine the world as a collection of economic actors, interests and transactions, which can then be 
counted, managed and changed108. Such economic outlook does seem to follow the modern ‘desire’ 
mentioned by Ahenakew et al, notably ‘to name the world in order to control it’109.   
21 
 
The projects that assess feasibility and potential trajectories of economic development, such as the one 
aiming to expand the mining sector in Mongolia110 or the production of palm oil in Papua New Guinea111, 
are the epitome of such primacy of economic reasoning. They subject all the social interests and forms of 
knowledge to the economic objectives of the Bank and its borrower, often pioneering the pathway to 
change that affected people are not willing to accept. In such instances the affectedness paradigm is 
probably the least likely to enable meaningful dialogue. That is because the arguments in favour of the 
project are too strongly rooted in the institutional objectives of the Bank and its prevalent culture of 
economic reasoning. In some other instances on the other hand, such as in the project on sustainable 
forestry management in Kenya, the conversation with affected indigenous peoples might be less one-
sided, because their concern with sustainability is more closely aligned to that of the Bank. Hence, 
depending on the project, and given a certain alignment between the objectives of the Bank and the 
affected people, affectedness framework can be useful and amplify the voices that would otherwise be 
excluded from the conversation. 
Who decides who gets affected? The potential role for mediators 
It was argued in the preceding parts of this paper that affectedness paradigm harbours the need to 
reconcile diverging objectives and worldviews of many people involved in development projects. For 
some grassroots this divergence of attitudes is potentially detrimental; for instance, in case of indigenous 
groups whose very existence depends on the natural environment that development projects are able to 
destroy. Other movements, falling under the wider notion of political society by Chatterjee, might take 
less of an issue with economic outlook of development, because their collective identity and their 
objectives are more malleable and less averse to the tendencies of modernisation. Either way, most 
movements seem to understand the need to coexist with modernity – rather than to challenge its very 
existence112. The core question is how to make sure that the terms of reference of such co-existence are 
fair and not too biased towards economic, linear notions of progress. Put otherwise, how the idea of 
affectedness can facilitate the negotiations about development under more balanced terms? 
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It follows from the analysis thus far that the role of those in charge of negotiations over development 
projects is extremely important in fulfilling this task. Taking into consideration the concerns about 
political closure and co-optation, who should be in charge of identifying the affected people, and also 
guiding the project-related negotiations? The World Bank, if not because of its mandate than de facto, 
often acts as an intermediary in charge of this exercise. However, it has been demonstrated in the 
preceding parts of this paper that neither the IFIs nor their accountability mechanisms are suitable entities 
to take on such a role. They themselves have biases of reasoning that are likely to put the grassroots at a 
disadvantaged position. 
Who, then, might be neutral yet capable enough to engage in such a role of independent intermediary? 
The World Bank’s ESF contains a provision in that regard113, according to which affected people114  
should be identified by the ‘independent third party specialists’115.  In the context of the 
ESF‘“[i]ndependent” means that the specialist is able to provide professional, objective and impartial 
advice, without consideration of future work, and avoiding conflicts with other assignments…’116.  This is 
a new provision that is yet to be implemented. Nonetheless, it indicates the general ‘direction of travel’ in 
this area of development governance. 
 In my view, this is a promising direction. It makes it possible to transpose the identification of affected 
people outside the problematic institutional context dominated by the economic interests of the Bank and 
the borrower. However, I would argue that by introducing such a provision, the World Bank did not go far 
enough. To become more transparent and less ‘tied’ to the will of decision-makers, such provision should 
emphasise what kind of specialists should be appointed to such an important role. For instance, the 
identification of affected people should be done by someone with certain measure of sensibility to the 
facets of grassroots movements noted in the previous sections (such as informality, identity claims, and 
alternative viewpoints). For all the reasons explained above, it would be best to stay clear from the 
‘established international experts’ trained solely in the economic aspects of development.  
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A similar question about the relationship between political society and relevant administrative authorities 
was raised by Chatterjee. ‘Who mediates?’ – was his question. Chatterjee’s question also gives us an 
indication of where to look for an answer to this question. Arguably, the exercise of identifying affected 
people as well as the relevant stakeholders in a given project should be seen as a part of a political 
mediation process. This can be distinguished from the currently prevalent and more technical exercise of 
ESIA, which is usually accomplished through scrupulous collection of data and/or abstract analytical 
reasoning. Mediation appears to be useful in fulfilling this task because it helps to build consensus 
amongst a wider circle of stakeholders in a more direct and interactive way than the ESIA does. Yet, 
despite its productive use in other areas of international assistance such as peacebuilding, mediation in 
development cooperation is usually only invoked post facto, that is, when development project causes 
disagreement and/or another form of social conflict117. However, it is very rarely used as a consensus-
building mechanism that helps to create dialogue amongst the Bank, the borrower and the affected people 
from the outset of the project. 
Accordingly, the role of ‘independent third-party specialists’ in charge of identifying affected people 
could be assigned to trained mediators. This does not mean that all the projects funded by the Bank 
should be prepared with the help of international experts trained in high diplomacy. To the contrary, in 
certain instances mediation can also be effective if conducted by community mediators, particularly 
women, and also with some local background118. Such mediators might not be able to resolve all the 
issues associated with the affectedness paradigm outlined above. Moreover, the issues and shortcomings 
of such governance solution should be subject to further research; ideally building on the lessons from the 
role of mediation in development context thus far. However, the very existence of such an independent 
mediation framework would go a long way in liberating the notion of ‘affected people’ from some of the 
biases associated with the World Bank’s decision-making and its top-down tendencies.  
The second step of ‘untying’ affectedness from the World Bank concerns the mandate of such potential 
mediators. Arguably, in order for this role to be successful, the process of mediation should go beyond the 
24 
 
‘constituent moment’ in which affected people are identified. It is difficult to see why mediation of 
existing or potential conflicts should be limited to the early stages of the project, given that development 
is likely to cause disruption to the lives of affected people over a significant period of time and on a 
relatively large scale. Instead, mediation should take place during the entire project negotiations as well as 
during the implementation phase. The ESF contains provisions that require of the borrower to create 
project grievance mechanisms, which are meant to give a chance to affected people to raise any issues 
that they see about the implementation of the project119. However, arguably such grievance mechanisms 
function predominantly as troubleshooting devices for the borrower, rather than a neutral space for 
reconciling political disagreements, which is the key reason for invoking mediation in this context.  
The third important element of ‘untying’ affected people from the will of decision-makers is probably the 
most difficult one to address120. It concerns the fair practices of representation within a given community, 
as well as alignment of interests of multiple communities affected by the same development project. 
Whilst many people could fall under the category of ‘affected people’, they might not necessarily have a 
consolidated view about the best ways to go forward with a given project. This lack of initial consensus 
can be instrumentalised by the decision-makers and used to justify their exercise of a top-down decision-
making authority. Indeed, because resistance movements do not usually have an arborescent structure, 
functioning under the unified umbrella of affectedness can be challenging for them, because it pushes 
them to create social hierarchies and to make far-reaching political commitments on behalf of others. 
These are potentially difficult challenges, and arguably the third-party mediators, in the process of 
identifying affected people, would require further guidance on how to identify the specific representatives 
who are truly able to encourage consensus-building amongst different people affected by the same 
development project. In this regard, an on-going research about the representation of affected people121, 
and particularly the relationship between affected people and NGOs122 seem important, timely and of 
great relevance to future policy guidance in this area. 
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Mediation is not a panacea that can ensure the resolution of all the conflicts related to a given project. 
Nonetheless, it could provide a tangible tool for recognising the very possibility of diverging views, and 
thus taking the need for their reconciliation seriously. That way, the implied biases of affectedness 
paradigm can be brought into the open and dealt with in a way that shows more respect to the attitudes 
and concerns of the grassroots.  
Conclusion: the story of affectedness in the making 
Generally, this paper shows that the content of affectedness paradigm is still in the making. On the one 
hand, it is an idea that is reshaping global development governance by providing a structural foundation 
to the agency of bottom-up resistance. It also marks a positive departure from the prevalent governance 
model that largely disregards the views of local groups. On the other hand, it is increasingly appropriated 
by the IFIs as a strategy of institutionalisation and possibly co-optation. Moreover, at least in the current 
governance framework of the World Bank, affectedness is indeed ‘tied’ too strongly to the will of 
decision-makers. As such, it cannot be praised for its emancipatory potential. It is also difficult to tell for 
whose benefit this concept currently functions123, and also what might be its effects in the future.  
The reason why the notion of ‘tied affectedness’ is important in the conversation about global governance 
is because it shows the nuanced ways through which institutionalised inclusion can undermine dissenting 
voices. ‘Tied affectedness’ also stresses the need to address the top-down biases of the affectedness 
paradigm, and to level the playing field of decision-making by introducing checks and balances into the 
requirements of inclusion, so that the grassroots can rely on them without also having a fear of co-
optation and/or further marginalisation. In this paper I make one suggestion in that regard, notably to 
involve the third-party mediators in the process of identifying affected people. Arguably, other methods of 
ensuring more balanced dialogue remain subject to future research.  
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